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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 12-1126
____________
ARCHWAY INSURANCE SERVICES,
Appellant
v.
JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-02711)
District Judge: Honorable Thomas N. O‟Neill, Jr.
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 14, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 21, 2012 )
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Archway Insurance Services, LLC appeals from the District Court‟s order entering
judgment after a bench trial on its breach of contract claim in favor of James River
Insurance Co. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.

I.
We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
In this case, Archway, an insurance broker, seeks to recover from James River, an
insurance company, a $158,000 payment made under a guarantee by Archway to Bank
Direct Capital Finance, LLC, a lender, for James River‟s failure to refund an unearned
premium for part of the term of a general and professional liability insurance policy that
Archway placed with James River for The Ardsley Group, Inc., a management company,
on Ashton Hall, Inc., a nursing home business, in 2007. In exchange for this guarantee
payment, Bank Direct assigned Archway the right to recover the unearned premium
based on James River‟s failure to cancel the policy at Ardsley‟s request. Archway sued
James River in the Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court, and James River removed
the case to the District Court. After a bench trial on its breach of contract claim, the
District Court held against Archway, reasoning that James River was not liable because
although Ardsley had cancelled the policy, it impliedly waived its right to recover the
unearned premium through its post-cancellation conduct. Archway timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. After a bench trial, “we
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review [a] [d]istrict [c]ourt‟s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de
novo.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 609 F.3d 143, 156 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quotation omitted). We review a district court‟s rulings on the admissibility of evidence
and the imposition of discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion. Newman v. GHS
Osteopathic, Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156 (3d Cir. 1995).
III.
Archway claims that the District Court erred in determining that Ardsley impliedly
waived its right to the return of any unearned premium by working with Reliant
Healthcare Management, Inc., Ashton Hall‟s managing agent, to pay premium
installments to Bank Direct under a finance agreement and by renewing the Ashton Hall
insurance policy with James River in 2008. Archway also contends that the District
Court abused its discretion in allowing Nathan Niles, the Vice President of Finance for
Reliant, to testify. We address these arguments in turn.1
A.
Archway argues that the District Court erred in determining that Ardsley impliedly
waived its right to the return of any unearned premium through its post-cancellation
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Because we affirm the District Court‟s ruling on each of these issues, we need
not address James River‟s proposed alternative basis for partially affirming the order,
namely, that the Pennsylvania Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act, 40
Pa. Stat. § 1303.747, prevented the cancellation of the professional liability portion of the
insurance policy because the Insurance Commissioner of the Commonwealth did not
receive a written notice of cancellation.
3

conduct. Under Pennsylvania law,2 a waiver “is the act of intentionally relinquishing or
abandoning some known right, claim or privilege.” Brown v. Pittsburgh, 186 A.2d 399,
401 (Pa. 1962). “„To constitute a waiver of legal right, there must be a clear, unequivocal
and decisive act of the party with knowledge of such right and an evident purpose to
surrender it.‟” Commonwealth ex rel. Corbett v. Griffin, 946 A.2d 668, 679 (Pa. 2008)
(quoting Brown, 186 A.2d at 401). The waiving party‟s intent is controlling, Brown, 186
A.2d at 401 n.3, and it may be implied by “undisputed acts or language so inconsistent
with a purpose to stand on the contract provisions as to leave no opportunity for a
reasonable inference to the contrary.” Samuel J. Marranca Gen. Contracting Co. v.
Amerimar Cherry Hill Assocs., 610 A.2d 499, 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
Archway correctly notes that the finance agreement imposed an independent
contractual obligation on Ardsley to pay premium installments to Bank Direct. But the
record also reflects that the agreement, which was signed by Stanley Segal, Ardsley‟s
owner, stated that if Ardsley failed to pay an installment, Bank Direct could cancel the
insurance policy. Further, Ardsley received four cancellation notices, at least three of
which were brought to Segal‟s attention, which explicitly threatened that Bank Direct
would cancel the policy if late installments were not paid. Notwithstanding Segal‟s
knowledge that he could cancel the policy by simply ignoring the notices, he personally
collaborated with Niles at least twice to ensure that late installments were paid. Segal‟s
2

The parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies to this case.
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conduct shows an intent to prevent Bank Direct from cancelling the policy that is
inconsistent with Ardsley‟s right to the return of any unearned premium.
Archway also claims that the renewal of the insurance policy cannot be attributed
to Ardsley because Fifty Jersey, LLC, another management company, owned Ashton Hall
in March 2008. However, Segal did not sell Ashton Hall until April 2008, and the
insurance application names Ardsley as an insured. The application also indicates that it
is for the renewal of an existing policy rather than for the issuance of a new policy and
states that the 2008 policy was scheduled to begin on the same date that the 2007 policy
was scheduled to end, confirming that the new policy was, in fact, a renewal of the old
policy. Ardsley‟s affirmative act of renewing the policy with James River shows its
intent to abandon its right to the return of any unearned premium.
Archway finally contends that James River was not prejudiced by Ardsley‟s
conduct because there was no evidence of a post-cancellation claim on the insurance
policy. As an initial matter, an email sent in December 2008 from James River to All
Risks, Ltd., another insurance broker, states that claims were made against the 2007
policy, albeit at an unspecified time. Moreover, the policy could not have been renewed
if it had been cancelled, and James River may have offered Ardsley the renewal on more
advantageous terms than a new policy. Because Ardsley solicited and James River issued
the 2008 policy as a renewal of the 2007 policy, Ardsley‟s post-cancellation conduct
prejudiced James River. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that Ardsley
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impliedly waived its right to the return of any unearned premium, and thus, that James
River did not breach the policy.
B.
Archway also argues that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting
Niles‟s testimony based on James River‟s alleged failure to identify Niles in its required
initial disclosures, its required pretrial disclosures, and its interrogatory responses. Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party must: (1) disclose “each individual likely to
have discoverable information,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i); (2) disclose “each
witness,” id. at 26(a)(3)(A)(i), “at least 30 days before trial,” id. at 26(a)(3)(B); and
(3) “supplement or correct its [required] disclosure or [interrogatory] response,” id. at
26(e)(1). When a party does not comply with these rules, “[it] is not allowed to use that
. . . witness to supply evidence . . . at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified
or is harmless.” Id. at 37(c)(1).
Here, Archway claims that James River neglected to name Niles in its initial
disclosures or in its response to an interrogatory about the identity of its witnesses.
Archway also contends that James River never supplemented its disclosures or responses
with Niles‟s information. However, as the District Court correctly noted, James River
identified Niles as an anticipated witness in a pretrial memorandum filed well over thirty
days prior to trial. Archway Ins. Servs., LLC v. James River Ins. Co., No. 2-09-cv-02711,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143596, at *13 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2011). Therefore, the
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District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude Niles‟s testimony. See
Newman, 60 F.3d at 156 (holding no abuse of discretion where district court refused to
exclude witnesses‟ testimony because party‟s possible failure to disclose witnesses in
self-executing disclosures and in interrogatory responses was harmless since opponent
knew of witnesses “well before trial”).
IV.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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